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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
RAMONA HAYWARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEO GEORGE EASTMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8525 
This is an automobile accident case. The Plaintiff 
filed suit against the Defendant. The case was tried to 
a jury and the jury brought in a verdict of no cause of 
action. 
The Defendant and his friend, Kenneth R. Parry, 
were going east in his automobile and hit the Plaintiff 
and her companion, Mrs. Fay Osborne, while they were 
behind the car in which they had been riding, crushing 
them between the two cars. 
The accident occurred about a mile and a half west 
of Fort Herriman on the Lark-Herriman road, U. S. 
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Highway No. 111 at about 1 a.IIL on November 26, 1953. 
(Ex. 41, officer's report). 
The highway at the point of the accident was a 
blacktop road, sixteen feet wide, with shoulders of vary-
ing widths. (Map, Ex. 32), (Photographs Ex. 29, 4, 42, 
45), (Officers report Ex. 41), (R. 246), and with a faint 
yellow line in the middle. There was a slight down grade 
with a slight curve for a distance of about 500 feet to 
the west, C~Iap, Ex. 28,) (Photographs, Ex. 4, 29, 3, 45), 
(Officers report Ex. 41), (R. 258, 259, 141, 142), and 
with a sharp curve 600 feet to the west. (Map, Ex. 28), 
(Photographs, Ex. 2), (R. 246, 385, 141). Vision was not 
obs,cured. It was on a clear night. The ~t-oad was dry 
with no defects. (R. 278). It was in open country. The 
automobile in which the Plaintiff had been riding was 
parked on the side of the road. The accident occurred 
close to a telephone pole which could be seen 400 to 500 
feet from the west. (R. 142, 218, 232, 248), (Officers 
report, Ex. 41, and maps). 
The Plaintiff, Ramona Hayward, and her husband 
and family were living in Riverton at the time of the 
accident. During the afternoon prior to the accident, 
Plaintiff went to her friend, Mrs. Fay Osborne's home 
to assist her in preparing Thanksgiving dinner that they 
were going to have .at the Osborne residence on Thanks-
giving d·ay. 
Mr. Francis Osborne can1e hon1e from work about 
r> o'clock (R. 112), and then went to the store. While' 
he was away, Ralph Crane, a relative of the Osbornes', 
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came to the Osborne home. Mr. Osborne returned home 
from the store about 9 o'clock (R. 113) and after they 
had something to eat, Mrs. Osborne wanted some Kool 
cigarettes and suggested that they· go to Riverton to 
buy them. So the Plaintiff and Mrs. Osborne and Mr. 
Osborne and Ralph Crane went to Riverton in the Os-
borne car. They went to Viv's and Arch's a restaurant 
and beer parlor in Riverton. (R. 113, 114). They stayed 
at Viv's and Arch's from about ten thirty to eleven thirty 
and upon leaving decided to take a ride. (R. 113). They 
went to West Jordan and from there to Lark. On their 
way back, Mrs. Osborne stopped the automobile and 
parked off the side of the road so that she could go to 
the bathroom. (R. 114, ~15). 
Plaintiff and Fay Osborne went to the bathroom on 
a side hill. When they came back, Plaintiff looked both 
ways. There were no ·cars coming so they started to go 
behind their car. Plaintiff heard a noise and she looked 
up. She could see car lights. She said, "Just a minute, 
Fay, here comes a car," and she turned her head to see 
if F·ay was with her and had stopped. Plaintiff turned 
around to see where the car was. Just turned her head 
and it was almost on her. She tried to step back, but 
she couldn't move. She couldn't get out of the way. 
She was scared. (R. 122, 123, 156). She estimated the 
car was traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour and the car 
came straight at her (R.157). 
After the Plaintiff was hit, she tried to pick herself 
up off the road. Her hands were in the gravel. She 
tried to raise herself off the road, but couldn't. She was 
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lying on her side with both legs bent under and the 
bottom half of her legs were laid up against the top part 
of her legs. (R. 124). She was picked up and put in 
the front seat of the Osborne car and Mrs. Osborne was 
put in the back seat of the Osborne car. Thereafter they 
were transferred to Mr. Kaywood's car. Mr. Kaywood 
lived close to where the accident happened and he drove 
them to the Bingham Canyon hospital which was closed. 
( R. 1.25). They then went to Midvale where they were 
met by the ambulance (R. 180) and taken to the emer-
gency hospital in Salt Lake City and given blood trans-
fusions R. 180, 185). Plaintiff was in the St. Mark's hos-
pital from November 26, 1953 to February 8, 1954, and 
was back in the hospital five other times, leaving the hos-
pital in a wheel chair on the 26th day of April, 1955, one 
year and five months after the accident and thirty-four 
days before the trial. (Ex. 9). 
The Plaintiff contended that the car was being driven 
by Leo George Eastman, the Defendant; but the Defend-
ant contended that the car was being driven by Kenneth 
R. Parry and not as his agent Plaintiff relied upon the 
officer's report (Ex. 41) and the statement made by 
Leo George Eastman to the police officers that he was 
driving the ear (R. 362, 274, 280), and the conversation 
between Mr. Hay" .. ard and Mr. Osborne and Mr. East-
Dian, in which Mr. Eastman stated he was driving the 
car. (R. 241, 242). 
There was a lot of aspersions about Plaintiff's and 
Mrs. Osborne's drinking; but there was very little actual 
evidence of their drinking. The Plaintiff was not drunk 
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and Mrs. Osborne had nothing to drink. They are the 
two persons injured and involved in the accident. (R. 
398, 235). The evidence on drinking of the respective 
parties was that the Defendant, Eastman, had two cans 
of beer at Viv's and Arch's (R. 355, 366), one drink of 
beer at the Drift-Inn in Lark and opened a can of beer 
on the way back to Riverton. (R. 367). Kenneth R. Parry 
had two beers at Viv's and Arch's (R. 307), drank one 
beer at the Drift-Inn in Lark (R. 309), and two cans of 
beer were opened in the car on the way back to Riverton, 
(R. 367), one can apiece. (R. 317). 
That the Plaintiff had one beer in the afternoon at 
the Osborne home and nothing else to drink during that 
time (R. 147), one drink of whiskey before going to Viv's 
and Arch's (R. 148), and one drink of beer at Viv's and 
Arch's. (R. 114). That Mrs. Fay Osborne had nothing 
whatsoever to drink. (R. 235). 
Mike Humphrey, a mechanic at the Riverton Motor 
Company, described the Osborne automobile and the 
amount of blood that was in the automobile·. That there 
was flesh on the right side, underneath on the cross beam 
of the car (R. 164); that the left side of the car was 
damaged and the left back panel had to be repaired and 
the left tail light had to be repaired. (Repair order, 
Ex. 11), (R. 167), and testified that both sides. of the 
trunk of the Osborne car were bent. Each side of the 
center of the hood of the Eastman car was damaged. 
Hortense Wood, custodian of the records of the St. 
Mark's Hospital, identified the hospital record of the 
Plaintiff. (R. 172-174). 
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Francis Osborne testified that the Eastman car went 
30 to 35 feet after the accident, (R. 178) and that the 
Osborne car went 70 to 80 feet (R. 178); and that there-
after they pushed the car out of the road. (R. 179). 
That they put the girls in the Osborne car then trans-
ferred them to the Kaywood car went to Bingham, then 
to Midvale, then to the County Hospital (R. 180), had 
a conversation in which Eastman admitted driving the 
car. (R. 182), and testified that the Eastman car turned 
left across the road and that the Osborne car was knocked 
straight down the road. (R. 183). That his car was 
three feet on the pavement and three feet on the oil 
when hit. He testified that he measured from the tele-
phone pole to the curve sign and that it was 408 feet, 
and that from the telephone pole to the sharp curve was 
605 feet. (R. 215, 216), (Ex. 3). That a car parked at the 
telephone post could be seen 500 feet away. (R. 218). 
That the park lights on his car were turned on. (R. 215). 
That Mr. Osborne on rebuttal testified that his car 
was 6 feet, 2 inches from fender to fender and that the 
wheel fro1n wheel to wheel outside 1neasure was 5 feet, 
3 inches and that his car from bun1per to bumper was 
16 feet, 3 inches. (R. 396). 
Clara Fay Osborne testified that the Plaintiff was at 
her ho1ne and that they went to ,~iv's and Arch's and 
that she had nothing to drink. (R. 233, 235). That she 
ren1P1nbered driving off the road, right side of car on the 
dirt, seeing the telephone pole, taking the keys out of the 
ignition and after that, she had an entire loss of memory 
until she was in the hospital. (R. 237, 241). That Dr. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lamb testified that after injuries .and loss of blood, the 
memory is often affected. (R. 212, 213). 
Mrs. Osborne on rebuttal testified that she had put 
the car in gear and that the park lights were on and that 
Mrs. I-Iayward was not drunk. (R. 397 and 398). 
Franklin S. Harris, Professor of Physical Science, 
University of Utah, testified going to the scene of the 
accident (R. 243 to 246), and making tests with a 1951 
Ford, the same model as the Defendant's car, that the 
car could be stopped in a distance of 66 feet, going 45 
miles per hour. (R. 384). That a car parked on either 
side of the telephone pole could be seen for a distance 
of 400 feet to 500 feet. (R. 248, 249, 385, 386), (Ex. 28). 
That it was approximately 600 feet to the sharp turn, 
(R. 246) and if a person is looking, he can see taillights 
from the sharp curve. That a car could be plainly seen 
for 400 feet if parked on the east side of the telephone 
pole or on the west side of the telephone pole. Drew 
diagram (Ex. 28), and marked the places where he 
carried on the experiments. That a car laying down 
72 feet of skid marks would be going 42 miles per hour 
(R. 387) and if it hit a car or object that would mean 
the car would be going f.aster than 42 miles per hour. 
If the car was going 15 miles per hour .at time of impact 
and laid down 72 feet of skid marks, that would mean 
the car was going faster than 43 miles per hour. (R. 388, 
389). In addition to that, if the car also turned and 
made marks on the pavement, it would be going still 
faster (R. 389) and it it hit another object it would 
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mean additional speed. That a car going 40 miles per 
hour would travel during the reaction time 44 feet; at 
50 miles per hour, 55 feet, at 60 miles per hour 66 feet; 
and at 70 miles per hour, 77 feet. (R. 389, 390). 
Dr. Lamb testified that he was called to the hospital 
on November 26, 1953 ; that Plaintiff had a compound 
fracture. That the bones of her legs were exposed to the 
out side and the bone fragments were protruding through 
the soft tissues and he took care of the fracture and put 
screws in the bones to hold them together (R. 191 to 199). 
That half or two thirds of the tissue in each leg had been 
smashed and crushed. (R. 186). That he operated, re-
moving the dead tissue and sutured the remaining tissue 
(R. 186). Plaintiff was listed as critical on the hospital 
records, meaning that she might die. 
That he exhibited the x-rays (Ex. 18 through 24 
inclusive) and described them in details, (R.188) explain-
ing how it was necessary to scrape the bone, which is 
called saucerization. (R.196). He stated it was necessary 
to take some bone from the hip and graft it onto the leg 
and described the operation of bone grafting. (R. 197). 
Plaintiff left the hospital on April 26, 1955, in a wheel 
chair. That l\frs. Hayward might have to return to the 
hospital and that the bone graft may not be successful. 
Exhibit 9 shows that the hospital bill is $3,509.95. Ex-
hibit 10 shows that Dr. Lamb's bill is $1,617.75 up to 
date of trial. 
William Tipton testified that he had drawn the map 
to scale, (Ex. 32), (R. 259), and identified a picture 
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taken by him 200 feet west of the telephone pole. (Ex. 
29). That he had taken Exhibit 30 which is 50 feet west 
of the telephone pole (R. 256), and that he had taken 
the picture (Ex. 31), (R. 257) which is looking west from 
100 feet east of the telephone pole. That it is 400 feet 
from the telephone pole to the sign. ( R. 260, 261) and 
an additional 200 fet to the first sharp turn (R. 261), 
(Ex. 33), that the map was drawn to scale and the survey 
shows very little curve. (Ex. 28). 
Carl George, the deputy sheriff of Salt Lake· County, 
made the investigation, and arrived at the scene of the 
accident at 2 :08 a.m. The accident occurred about 1 a.m. 
See exhibit 41. The accident occurred about one and 
one half miles west of Fort Herriman. That he measured 
72 feet of skid marks. (R. 267), (Officers report, Ex. 41, 
Map Ex. 32). 
He identified exhibit 34 and 35 and that they were\ 
introduced in evidence over Plaintiff's objection, (R. 270), 
identified the automobiles in exhibit 36 as being the 
Eastman car and in exhibit 37 as being the Osborne car. 
(R. 271). 
He talked to Mr. Parry and Mr. Eastman at the 
scene of the accident, that they had something to drink 
(R. 274), that Mr. Eastman told him that he was driving 
the automobile (R. 274). That the skid marks were 3 
feet, 6 inches from the center of the highway, (R. 275, 
276.) That the skid marks were on the left hand side 
going east. He didn't go back to the scene of the accident 
(R. 276) and had never seen the photographs until the 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
afternoon of the trial, that he marked on the accident 
report that vision was not obscurred, the pavement was 
dry, and no defe·cts. (R. 278). The Eastman car was 
going 40 miles an hour; he thinks he got this information 
from Defendant, Eastman. The Eastman car went 32 
feet after the impact. (R. 279). The Osborne car 
traveled 84 feet after the impact. (R. 279). He made 
some rough notes at the scene of the accident and they 
were his original work sheets which is part of exhibit 
41, (R. 281). That he had written over some of his marks 
(R. 282). He has it marked on his work sheet, girls 35 
feet, but doesnt remember what it means. (R. 283). 
That he determined the point of impact as being 1110 
of a mile from the Kaywood residence (R. 284). That 
72 feet of skid marks is a line running down the left 
side of the Defendant's car. That the map shows 40 
inches which is 3 feet, 6 inches from the center line to 
the left front 'vheel (R. 284), (Ex.. 41), that he marked 
7 4 feet or inches to a tree, couldn't remember what the 
measuren1ent was for. The statement made by Kenneth 
R. Parry was part of the report (Ex. 41). He drew a 
map on the yellow accident report sheet (Ex. 41) and that 
as part of the report, he stated car number two (the 
Osborne car) parked on side of road; car number 1, (the 
Eastman car) going east, hit two ladies that were stand-
ing at rear of car number two, knocking both ladies up 
ag-ainst the bu1nper of car nmnber t"'O. He got this 
information partly from ~Ir. Eastman, partly from Mr. 
Parry, and fron1 observation. (R. 286). Officers report 
introduced as evidence (R. 286), that he got the full skid 
10 
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marks of the rear tire as 72 feet (R. 287, 288), did not 
smell the breath of Mr. Eastman or Mr. Parry (R. 288), 
said there was very little blood on the pavement (R. 288), 
did not examine the shoulder of the road for skid marks 
(R. 289). That his report shows that the car traveled 
32 feet after impact, although he put 2·4 feet on the 
board. (R. 292). That the Osborne car was in gear. 
(R. 295, 296). 
Archie C. Brown, one of the owners of Viv's and 
Arch's, testified that he didn't let anyone pour liquor in 
his place (R. 300), that he has known Mr. Eastman for 
12 years and that he comes to his place quite often, and 
that Kenneth R. Parry comes to his place quite often, 
oftener than Eastman. (R. 300). He doesn't know how 
many glasses of beer that he served to anyone that night. 
(R. 301). 
Ralph Crane testified that he went to the Osborne 
home about 9 o'clock. He had been drinking before he 
arrived at the Osborne home. He doesn't recall drinking 
whiskey at the Osborne home; doesn't know whether he 
let anyone drink out of his bottle, that he saw the girls 
laying in the road and in a minute or two thereafter he 
helped put them in the Osborne car. (R. 304). 
Kenneth R. Parry testified that he works for Archie 
McFarland & Sons Packing Co., on the killing floor. He 
had two glasses of beer at Viv's .and Arch's Tavern (R. 
307), did not know Mrs. Hayward. Left Viv's and Arch's 
at closing time; went to the Drift-Inn at Lark and did 
some drinking there. That he drove the car back because 
11 
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Defendant hadn't had his Ford very long and they had 
been talking about cars and he would like to drive the 
car to see how it handled (R. 309, 317, 324). Saw two 
people standing in the road facing each other; could see 
they were women. Applied brakes, but slid into them. 
(R. 310). His driving license had been revoked for 
drunken driving (R. 315), took one can of beer apiece out 
of the Drift-Inn with them (R. 317). Lights were good 
and on high beam (R. 318), was driving 40 miles per 
hour and was going 15 miles per hour at time of impact. 
One girls fell directly back of car; other one toward 
center (R. 318. Was familiar with the road, with the turn, 
and with the particular place where the accident hap-
pened. (R. 318). Had been over the road a thousand times 
girls (R. 320). Could only see west, up the road from the 
opposite direction. (R. 319). Both girls turned around 
before they were hit (R. 319, 320), applied brakes 10 
to 15 feet before he slid into the girls. Girls were only 
15 feet away from the Osborne car when they were put 
into it. Could see up the road 75 feet where he hit the girls 
(R. 320). Could only see west, up the road from the 
telephone pole 100 feet in day time and 75 to 100 feet 
at night (R. 321). Changed stories, could only see 50 to 
75 feet with the lights of the car on a straightaway. 
(R. 322, 323), drank two beers at \ ... iY"s and Arch's (R. 
323), went to try out the car (R. 324). Did not see the 
Osbornt} ear until he hit it (R. :3:25 ). Changed testimony, 
could seP a long 'vay~ down the road (R. 327), when 
confronted with his deposition. 
12 
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Occie Evans testified that he works for the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department. He helped Sheriff George 
make the measurements. That the skid marks were on 
the hard surface of the highway on the south or right 
hand side of the road going east and that the skid marks 
ended up on the dirt shoulder. (R. 330). Thinks possible 
point of impact was about 20 feet east of the telephone 
pole, (R. 331) and that he had written on the report, 
car number two parked on side of road, car number one 
going east. Hit two ladies who were standing at rear 
of car number two, knocking both ladies up against 
bumper of car number two. (R. 332). 
Lyle Bates testified that he was a Claims Adjustor 
.and Attorney for the Farmers Underwriters Association 
(R. 334). He went to the scene of the accident and exam-
ined it and took pictures at the scene of the accident and 
was allowed to make marks on the pictures (R. 350) and 
conclusions as to what the pictures showed over Plaint-
iff's objection (R. 339) and that he testified that there 
was blood .all over the place (R. 342). Pools of blood 
were betwe·en 2 and 3 feet. (R. 342). Other skid marks 
in Exhibit 38. (R. 343). Identified circle on hood where 
car was damaged. (R. 351). Exhibit 43 shows or looks 
like a line from a ·car with brakes on it. 
Leo George Eastman, the Defendant, testified that 
he was employed as a miner at Lark. That he went to 
Viv's and Arch's and that he saw Ralph Crane, Mrs. 
Hayward, and Mrs. Osborne. lie didn't see them drink 
any liquor. (R. 354). Eastman didn't particularly notice 
then and did not actually see them drink beer. (R. 354). 
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That he started talking to Kenneth R. Parry and that 
he had two glasses of beer (R. 355). That he left Viv's 
and Arch's at a quarter to 12 o'clock and went to Lark. 
Had beer at Drift-Inn in Lark and took beer out with 
them. Parry wanted to drive the car (R. 356). He let 
him drive. Car was going 40 miles per hour at time of 
accident (R. 356, 357). That he saw objects in the road; 
he thought for a minute it was stock, either horses or 
cows. Doesn't remember seeing the car at all. (R. 357). 
That he did not see the girls until they were 25 feet away 
from him. (R. 359). That the girls were facing east 
and did not change their position. That they were 100 
feet away when he first saw the objects in the road. 
(R. 360). That the Osborne car only went 20 to 25 feet. 
( R. 361). Mrs. Osborne, after the accident, was lying 
along side of the yellow line and Mrs. Hayward was 
lying to the right of her on the oil. (R. 361). The girls 
were picked up and put in the Osborne car and then 
transferred to the Kaywood car. (R. 364). That he had 
Sealed Beam head lights. That he could see objects from 
150 to 200 feet~ but could not see them 350 feet ahead 
( R. :16-1). Went to Lark for beers. Went to Viv's and 
Arch's for a beer, (R. 364, 365, 366). Opened the beers 
in the ear. (R. 367). Put the place where the curve 
started on the map a:nd initialed it. (R. 368), and testified 
that the accident occurred right at the curve. (R. 369). 
Said that Exhibit 2 showing sharp curve was sub-
stantially the way it looked at the time of the accident. 
(R. 369). During the testitnony of Mr. Eastman, Mr. 
H-ansen stated to the Court that the map was drawn to 
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scale, there were 50 foot intervals, that it is 400 feet to 
the curve sign, but if you followed the curve of the road 
it is about 430 feet. (R. 371). That exhibit 44 and 45 
were pictures where the accident occurred. Mr. East-
man testified that he could see about 300 to 400 feet 
up the road in the day time (R. 372, 373). Could see 75 
to 100 feet with lights (R. 373). In a straight line could 
see 200 feet west of the telephone pole. (R. 37 4). Chang-
ed stories, could only see 100 feet (R. 376). Doesn't 
know how far the lights would shine to the side of the 
road (R. 377). Could see the car up the road approx-
imately 80 feet (R. 380). Said place of impact was at 
curve or 5 to 10 fe·et from the curve (R. 380.) Changed 
testimonies and said could see the car up the road only 
80 feet and admitted that in his deposition he testified 
he said he could see up the road 150 feet (R. 381). That 
the girls were 5 feet apart after the impact. (R. 378). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER O·F LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AND FAILED TO· GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRO·RED IN ADMITTING CER.TAIN 
TESTIMONIES. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN EX~CLUDING CERTAIN 
TESTIMONIES. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING THE 
QUESTION OF LIGHTS AS ONE OF THE GROUNDS OF 
NEGLIGEN~CE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN OVER EMPHASIZING IN-
TOXICATION AS TO THE PLAINTIFF AND MINIMIZING 
THE DEFENDANT'S INTOXI·CATION. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN OVER RULING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT MADE ERRORS IN LAW OCCURRING BE-
FORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE TRIAL. 
ARGlT~IENT 
POIXT I. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
The argument "·hieh Plaintiff will make in regards 
to Point Nu1nber 1 "ill also apply to Points Nmnbered 2, 
5, 7 and 8. 
We have divided Point Number 1, for convenience, 
into 4 subdivi~ions .as follows: A. Speed: B. Lights; 
C. Control: D. Failure to keep a proper look out. 
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A. SPEED 
Defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of 
speed under the circumstances and conditions. The 
evidence on speed is that there were 72 feet of skid 
marks (R. 267), (Officer's report, Ex. 41). That the 
Osborne car, which was in gear, was knocked 70 to 80 
feet (R. 178), according to Mr. Osborne. According to 
the officer's report, the car was down the road 84 feet. 
The Eastman car swerved to the left, leaving tire marks 
across the highway for 32 feet. (Officer's report, Ex. 41 
and pictures.) 
Professor Harris testified and according to Mr. 
Hansen's chart (R. 388, 389), a car going 43 miles p.er 
hour will lay down 73 feet of skid marks. The Eastman 
car also knocked the Osborne car, which was in gear, 
from 70 to 80 feet and in addition to all that, left tire 
marks across the road which means that the car was 
being driven at a terrific rate of speed under the circum-
stances and conditions. 
Mrs. Hayward testified that she had neve·r seen a 
car coming so fast on that road, and that she judged 
it was going 50 to 60 miles per hour (R. 157). 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Parry was trying 
out Mr. Eastman's car, ·and it is fair to infer from the 
facts that he was trying to see how much of a pick up 
it had and how fast the car would go. The fact that the 
accident did occur is strong evidence of excessive speed. 
The f.act that the driver did not bring the car to a stop 
within the vision in which he could see objects upon the 
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road is also strong evidence of excessive speed or drunk-
enness. 
The road was dry. There was only a slight curve. 
Vision was not obscured. 
B. LIGHTS 
The final evidence on lights by the Defendant was 
that he could only see 80 feet (R. 380) and it is appar-
ently what he expected to be believed. 
The final evidence on lights by Mr. Parry, was that 
he could see 75 feet on a straightaway (R. 322, 323). 
The defendants testimony was that they were travel-
ing about 40 miles per hour which means they would 
travel 44 feet during reaction time, and there were 72 
feet of skid marks, total of 116 feet, and the car was still 
traveling. So they were not driving at a speed within 
which they could stop their car "~ithin the distance their 
lights "·ould sho'v objects on the road; or if they were 
lying about the distance they could see with the lights, 
then they must have been going altogether too fast. 
This is a far cry from having lights which will show 
objects on the road 350 feet as required by the Utal1 
Statute. 
If this were the condition of the defendants' lights, 
the car should not h.ave been going any 'vhere near the 
speed defendants were traveling. 
Mr. Eastman testified that he had sealed beam head 
lights. If this were the case, of course they met the statu-
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tory requirements of showing objects on the road for 350 
feet, and their evidence about lights is not true. 
C. CONTROL 
If the car had been under proper control, certainly 
they could have turned the car to the left. The road was 
dry. It was a clear night. No cars were coming from the 
opposite direction and the road was practically straight. 
Certainly if he had sealed beam head lights, which East-
man testified he had, the driver could have seen any 
objects on the road in time to have turned to the left. 
The car and the ladies did not move according to the 
Defendant's testimony. According to Plaintiff's testi-
mony, they couldn't get out of the way, they didn't have 
time. 
D. LOOKOUT 
If the driver had been keeping a proper look out, he 
would have seen the objects on the road and could have 
either turned the car to the left or could have stopped the 
car. Or if the driver had kept a proper look out, he would 
have decreased the speed so he could stop within the 
distance that his lights revealed objects on the highway. 
Mr. Eastman and Mr. Parry made certain state-
ments about how far they could see down the road which 
testimony is contrary to the physical facts and cannot be 
believed. 
When testimony is contrary to the physical facts, 
then that testimony should be disregarded. The follow-
ing authorities so held: 
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HAARSTICH vs. OREGON SHORT LINE RAIL-
ROAD CO., 70 U. 552, 262 P. 100. The Court says, page 
104, bottom of the first column of the Pac. that: 
"It only need be stated here that the testi-
mony of Mr. Howlett in that respect flies in the 
face of uncontroverted physical facts and there-
fore is not substantial evidence." 
Also see SPANG vs. COTE, 68 A. ( 2d) 823, (Me) and 
DOMINGUEZ vs. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. (Lou-
isiana) 47 So. (2d) 72. The last two cases are also author-
ities that a person must drive so he can see objects on 
the highway within the range of his lights. 
Certainly the driver was traveling too fast under 
the circumstances with which he was confronted and 
further with the fact that he had been over the road a 
thousand times. He knew the place and he knew all the 
curves in the road. 
This Court has had this question before them a num-
ber of times, and we submit that under the facts and 
circumstances as they were presented by the defendant 
himself, that he w.as guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law. 
There are a nu1nber of Utah cases dealing with this 
proposition, as to when a person is guilty of negligence 
as a 1natter of la"'"- They are familiar to this Court, 
but we think it advisable to review them. 
In the· O'BRIEN vs. ALSTON ET AL case, 61 U. 
368, 213 P. 791. At page 792 this Court says: 
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"Independent of any statute, it is negligence 
to run an automobile on a highway at night with-
out sufficient lights to enable the driver to see 
objects ahead of him in time to avoid them." 
This Court in the case of NIKOLEROPOULOS vs. 
RAMSEY, 61 U. 465, 214 P. 304 held that it was error 
to refuse the following instructions: 
"A driver of an automobile at night is re-
quired to use such reasonable and ordinary care, 
to have his machine under such control as to not 
overtake and run down people within the range 
of his lights, as would be used by a man of aver-
age and reasonable care and prudence in his 
situation." 
DALLEY vs. MID-WESTERN DAIRY PRO-
DUCTS CO. E·T AL., 80 U. 331, 15 P. (2d) 309. This 
Court held that it was negligence for an automobile 
driver who collided with a truck parked on a highway 
without lights was negligent as a matter of law. We quote 
from page 310 of the Pac. 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished "that it is negligence as matter of law for 
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot 
be stopped within the distance at which the opera-
~or of said car is able to see objects upon the 
highway in front of him." In the case of Nikolero-
poulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah, 465, 214 P. 304, the 
language just quoted is said to be a correct state-
ment of the law and that the refusal of the trial 
court to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error. 
In the case of O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 Utah, 368, 
213 P. 791, 792, it is said: 
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. "But entirely apart from any statutory re-
q~Irements, the law requires that, if a person de-
Sires to operate his automobile on the public 
streets or highways after dark he must see to it t~t it i~ equipped with proper: suitable, and suf-
ficient lights, so that the operator may discover 
any objects or obstructions that may be encoun-
tered on the highway." 
In the case of HANSEN vs. CLYDE, 89 U. 31, 56 
P. ( 2d) 1366, this Court says at page 1369 of the Pac. : 
"When a driver upon a public highway with 
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 feet 
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed 
as will enable him to stop within that distance. 
Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80 
Utah, 331, 15 P. (2d) 309." 
In the case of NIELSON vs. WATANABE 90 U. 
401, 62 P. (2d) 117, the Supreme Court cited and dis-
cussed the O'brien vs. Alston case 61 U. 368, 213 P. 791; 
Nikoleropoulos vs. Ran1sey, 61 r~. 465, 214 P. 304, 306; 
Dalley vs. l\Iid-''r estern Dairy Products Co., 80 U. 331, 
15 P. (2d) 309, and did not modify the doctrine therein 
set out, but distinguished the facts in that case in that 
the person was blinded by lights coming from the oppo-
site direction. The exception n1ade in the N"ielson vs. 
Watanabe case had no bearing on the present case be-
cause hy the Defendanfs o'Yn evidence in instant case, 
thP 1nap and the photographs and by Plaintiff's evidence, 
the Osborne car "?as rlearly Yisable for 400 feet and there 
were no lights coining fron1 the opposite direction~ the 
night was clear; the pavement was dry. 
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The NIELSON vs. WATANABE case, 90 U. 401, 
62 P. (2d) 117, held as set out in the headnote number 
4, as follows at page 118 of the Pac.: 
"It is negligence as a matter of law for a 
person to drive automobile at such speed that 
automobile cannot be stopped within distance at 
which driver of automobile is able to see objects 
on highway in front of him." 
To the same effect as the Nielson vs. Watanabe 
case 90 U. 401, 62 P. (2d) 117, is the cas~ of MOSS 
vs. CHRISTENSEN-GARDNER, INC. 98 U. 253, 98 P. 
(2d) 363, holding that the person was blinded by lights 
coming from the opposite direction and therefore dis-
tinguishes it on the facts, but reaffirms the rule in the 
Nikoleropoulos case and the Mid-VVestern Dairy Products 
Co. case. 
In the case of FARRELL vs. CAMERON 98 U. 68, 
94 P. (2d) 1068, the Court held, headnote 3: 
"In action for injuries to passenger in auto-
mobile colliding with defendant's automobile, 
facts found by trial court held to warrant his 
finding that defendant had ample time after 
seeing other automobile approaching when 100 
feet away to turn slightly to right and avoid 
collision." 
In the instant case, there is no reason why the 
Defendant should not have swerved his car and avoided 
the collision if he had been driving within the distance 
in which he could see objects on the road. 
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In the case of TRIMBLE ET UX. vs. UNION 
PACIFIC STAGES ET AL. 105 U. 457, 142 P. (2d) 
67 4, they set out the rule of law in this state to be: 
we quote from page 676 of the Pac: 
"In support of the contention that the court 
should have instructed that as a matter of law 
defendant was guilty of negligence. These cases 
lay down the rule that it is the duty of a driver of 
a motor vehicle moving along the highway at 
night to so drive his vehicle that he can stop 
before colliding with any object within the range 
of his headlights. And further, if the lights with 
which the vehicle is equipped are not up to the 
standard set by law, the driver must reduce his 
speed proportionately. Failure to observe this 
standard of care is negligence as a matter of law.'~ 
The Court then goes on to distinguish the case in that 
Defendant ran into a fog and that it was similar to the 
Nielson vs, Watanabe, 90 U. 401, 62 P. (2d) 117, 119. 
There is no fog or light in the instant case. 
In the WRIGHT 'Ts. MAYNARD case, 120 U. 504, 
235 P. (2d) 916, this Court said at page 917: 
"In Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products 
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309, 310, a case in 
which the plaintiff ran into a truck parked on 
the highway without lights, this court declared 
that it was the established law of this state, 
quoting from Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah 
465, 214 P. 304: "That it is negligence as a n1atter 
of law for a person to drive an automobile upon 
a traveled public highway, used by vehicles ~d 
pedestrians, at such a. rate of speed that sru.d 
automobile cannot be stopped within the distance 
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at which the operator of said car is able to see 
objects upon the highway in front of him." 
And the Court goes on further to distinguish the above 
set out rule in the Wright vs. Maynard case saying 
that the driver did see the Defendant in time to do some-
thing about it and that he did do something about it, 
which was he swerved to the right and if the Defendant 
had not stepped into his w.ay, that he would have avoided 
the accident. In this case, the Osborne car remained 
in the same place and the girls remained in the same 
position according to Defendant and Parry, and the 
driver of the car ran into them. 
In the case of HODGES vs. WAITE 2 U. (2d) 
152, 270 P. (2d) 461, the Court again .affirms the rule 
in the Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey case, 61 U. 465, 214 
P. 304; and the Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products 
Co. case 80 U. 331, 15 P. (2d) 309, and distinguishes on 
the fact that the Defendant, while rounding a SHARP 
CURVE in Logan Canyon, after seeing the truck, 
swerved his truck to the left; but could not avoid striking 
the rear of the trailer. 
There is no SHARP CURVE in the case at bar, 
you can tell this from Defendant's own photograph, 
which was taken 200 feet away from the point of the 
accident, that there was nothing to obstruct the view. 
You can tell from Defendant's map, (Ex. 32) and from 
all the pictures in evidence, that there was nothing to 
obstruct the view and the testimony of Professor Harris 
and others that the car could be seen from 400 to 500 
feet. Any testimony that the car could not be seen is 
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contrary to the physical facts and is not worthy of 
belief. See page 20 of this brief for authorities. 
So instant case does not come within the exception in 
the Hodges vs. Waite case. 
In the HORSLEY vs. ROBINSON, 112 U. 227, 186 
P. (2d) 592, this Court, speaking through Justice Wade 
sets out section 57-7-113 U. C. A. 1943 which provides: 
" (a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing. In every event speed shall be so con-
trolled as may be necessary to avoid colliding 
with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on 
or entering the highway in compliance ·with legal 
requirements and the duty of all persons to use 
due care. • * * * * * * • 
" (c) The driver of every vehicle shall, * • • 
drive at an appropriate reduced speed * • • when 
special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians 
or other traffic or by reason of weather or high-
way conditions." 
And from page 597, second column, the Court cites with 
approval as follows: 
"In Nikoleropoulos v-s. Rrunse~.,., 61 Utah 465, 
214 P. 304, the defendant "~as driving his car a.t 
night during a hea.,~~ rain storn1 at about 12 ~es 
per hour; in the distance the lights of oncommg 
cars reflected on the wet pavement into his eyes 
so that at the thne of the accident he was unable 
to see the plaintiff walking on the pavement in 
front of him until he "'"as within 6 feet and then 
it was too late to avoid running him down. We 
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held that defendant was negligent as a matter of 
law no matter how dark and stormy the night 
' or how bad the visability, if he drove at such a 
rate of speed that he was unable to avoid running 
plaintiff down within the distance plaintiff could 
be seen walking ahead of defendant's car on the 
highway. To the same effect see: Dalley vs. Mid-
Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 
2d 309; Haarstrich vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 
70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 
Utah 368, 213 P. 791. 
The Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey case is in 
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate 
a vehicle on the highway at any time without 
having it under sufficient control so that others 
using the highway will not be unreasonably en-
dangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is 
required to travel to accomplish that end." 
In the case of TAKATARO SHIBA vs. WEISS, 3 
U. (2d) 256, 282· P. (2d) 341, the Court reaffirms the 
doctrine we are contending for and speaking through 
Justice Wade says as follows on page 342 of the Pac.: 
"The facts in the instant case are very similar 
to those in Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products 
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309, where this Court 
held that the driver of a car which ran into a 
parked truck under such conditions was negligent 
as a matter of law." 
After a review of the Utah case it appears there-
from that it is still negligence as a matter of law in 
the state of Utah to drive your automobile at such a 
rate of speed that you cannot see objects on the highway 
in front of you. 
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The cases that have been distinguished are the ones 
in which the driver has been blinded by lights coming 
from the opposite direction which does not apply in 
this case because there were no cars coming from the 
opposite direction; or where there is fog which does 
not apply in this case because it was a clear night and 
vision was not obstructed, and no fog. 
The other exception was the case in which there 
was a SHARP CURVE in the canyon and this does not 
apply in this ·case because there was only a slight curve. 
The physical facts are so that any testimony to the 
contrary is not worthy of belief. 
POL~T II. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AND FAILED TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
The argument which Plaintiff will make in regards 
to Point Nu1nber 2 "ill also apply to Points Numbered 
5, 7 and 8. 
Instruction 6-a (R. 69) is erroneous and ambiguous. 
The Court lays down the general rule of stopping within 
the range of the headlights, and then qualifies it by the 
following language: 
"But in connection with this instruction you 
must consider the evidence of the highway and 
the conditions to determine 'vhether the lights 
would shine on the high,vay far enough ahead 
for the driver to stop before the in1pact in this 
case occurred." 
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The physical facts and the uncontradicted facts in this 
case are such that this qualification should not have been 
given. 
The Court further qualifies the general rule by the 
following language : 
"This rule of law that I have given you does 
not apply on a curve but only on a section that 
is sufficient straight for a person to stop within 
350 feet which is the required range of their 
head lights." 
What does the Court mean by a curve~ Does it mean 
a one degree, two degree, five degree, forty-five degree 
or a ninety degre·e curve~ Does the Court mean that after 
you have come around a ninety degree curve that you 
have 350 feet before you have to see objects in the road~ 
Does the Court mean that on a one degree curve the 
general rule does not apply and that you have 350 feet 
in which to stop your car if any object is in front of 
you~ 
When you look at Defendant's map, (Ex. 32), De-
fendants pictures and Plaintiff's pictures and the oral 
evidence, it is apparent that such an instruction should 
not have been given. 
Section 41-6-134 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provides: 
(a) "There shall be an uppermost distribu-
tion of light, or composite beam so aimed and of 
such intensity as to reveal persons and vehicles 
at a distance of at least 350 feet ahead for all 
conditions of loading." 
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By instruction 6-a (R. 69) the jury was told that 
any curve in which your lights would not show objects 
350 feet ahead of you and if you hit such objects, you are 
not negligent. We think this instruction is erroneous. 
We submit that instruction 6-a does not state Utah law 
and that such an instruction should not have been given 
under the facts in this case. 
Instruction 6-d (R. 72) pertains to the intoxication 
of the driver of the car. In contrast to that, the Court 
in instruction number 12 (R. 79) states: 
"You may consider her'' (Plaintiff) "condi-
tion of sobriety in connection with the problem 
of why she did not move back." 
Immediately thereafter, in instruction number 13, (79 B) 
the Court instructs on intoxication as against the pedes-
trian which is entirely more severe than instruction 6-d 
(R. 72) and emphasizes intoxication as to the plaintiff 
and minimizes it as to the defendant. Instruction number 
14 (R. 80) pertains to both of the parties drinking. The 
way these instructions are given and the way they are 
located over emphasize drinking and intoxication as to 
the Plaintiff and 1ninimize intoxication as to the Defen-
dant and is certainly highly prejudicial. This is a mighty 
touehy point before a jury. 
In instruction nu1nber 6-e, (R. 73) the Court says 
that Kenneth R. Parry's not having a drivers license 
can not be considered as appro:xin1ate cause of Plain-
tiff's injuries. This nullifies the effect that Kenneth R. 
l~arry had been drinking that night and was driving 
a car when he had no license to drive it, and that his 
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license to drive was revoked because of drunken driving. 
This factor should be considered in the c.ase, but by 
instruction number 6-e, it is practically eliminated from 
the deliberation of the jury. 
Instruction number 9, (R. 76) entirely leaves out the 
question of driving within the distance that the Defen-
dant could see with his lights. We called this matter 
to the Court's attention in our request for instruction 
number 22, (R. 61) where we set out the various things 
upon which the court should instruct and we feel this 
in the light of the other instruction was very prejudicial. 
In instruction number 11 (R. 78), the court says: 
"It is no legal excuse for the Plaintiff to 
say that she did not look or to say that she did 
not see at a time when by reasonable care an 
ordinary prudent person would have seen." 
In the next instruction, number 12, ( R. 79) the Court 
states that : 
"the plaintiff admitted that she saw the car 
coming and did not move; she claims that at first 
she thought she was safe and later she was un-
able to move." 
Certainly there was no reason to give instruction 
number 11 in the light of number 12, and that over 
emphasizes the duty of the Plaintiff to look and was 
highly prejudicial. Throughout the instructions to the 
jury, the court has over emphasized the duty of the 
Plaintiff and minimized the duty of the Defendant. 
Instruction number 15, (R. 80 A) is a very inter-
esting question. The Court instructed that they should 
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not consider insurance, but do they intend to have the 
adjustor, who went to the place and took pictures, not 
considered as an interested party in the law suit when 
the insurance company is actually responsible to pay 
any judgment up to the limits of their policy~ 
We asked the Court in our requested instruction 
number 1 (R. 40) to instruct the jury that Defendant 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
On the motion for a new trial, Plaintiff argued 
to the Court that the Defendant was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law and, therefore, the Court should 
grant a new trial which the trial court failed to do. 
The Court should have given Plaintiff's requested 
instruction 2, ( R. 41) without the exceptions, as the 
Court did in instruction number 6-a heretofore dis-
cussed. 
The Court should have given the Plaintiff's re-
quested instructions 8 and 9, (R. 47, 48). That if the 
Defendant had been keeping a proper look out, he would 
have seen Plaintiff in plenty of time to have swerved 
to the left and avoided hitting the Plaintiff. We were 
also entitled to instructions nun1bers 8 and 9 under 
the last clear chance doctrine and on the facts and 
authoriti0~ of BECI{STR(l~I Y. ''TILLIA~IS, 3 U. (2d) 
210, 282 P. (2d) 309. Under the facts 8Jld the reasoning 
in the Beckstrom rase, the driver of the automobile in 
the instant case had sufficient time to avoid hitting 
Plaintiff. 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instruction number 14, (R. 53) said as follows: 
"You are instructed that the law provides 
that a persons automobile must be equipped with 
lights so as to reveal persons and vehicles at a 
distance of at least 350 feet ahead." 
This is the Utah law as set out in section 41-6-134 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and under the Defendants' testi-
mony in this case that he .and his agent could only see 
from 75 to 80 feet with their lights. This instruction 
should have been given or the Court should have in-
structed as a matter of law, that the Defendant was 
negligent. 
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 10, (R. 49) 
states that the driver of an automobile should be care-
ful because he is driving a vehicle which is able to 
inflict serious injuries or death, and we think the case 
of COOMBS vs. PERRY, 2 U. (2d) 381, 275 P. (2d) 
680 is in point where on page 682 of the Pac. the Court 
says: 
"It is to be borne in mind that although the 
motorist and pedestrian are both required to exer-
cise the same standard of care, that of the ordin-
ary prudent person under the circumstances, that 
standard imposes upon the motorist a greater 
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian be-
cause of the potential danger to others in the 
operation of an automobile." 
As an illustration of the Courts' instructions being 
more favorable to the Defendant, take example instruc-
tion number 2, (R. 64). The Court says as to the Plain-
tiff: 
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"The plaintiff in this case has the burden 
of showing BY A PREPONDERANCE of the 
evidence that the defendant was negligent." 
and as to the Defendant, the Court says: 
. "And the defendant has the burden of prov-
Ing that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent." 
but did not add the words, "by a preponderance of the 
evidence." 
Instruction number 8, (75A) on sympathy only men-
tions the Plaintiff and doesn't mention the Defendant. 
It is unilateral. It tells the jury by innuendo that the 
Plaintiff doesn't have a case. We ask this Court to please 
compare it with the instruction given on sympathy in 
the suggested Uniform Jury Instructions of the Utah 
State Bar which is as follows: 
"4. (BAJI 4.) 
RE: SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION 
You must weigh and consider this case with-
out regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion 
for or against (ANY) (EITHER) party to the 
action." 
Whieh instruction "~as taken from California Jury In-
structions, Civil, Volume 1, page 54, number 4, which 
quotes the above and the note says: 
''This instruction given: Gray vs. Brinker-
hoff, 249 P. 2d 571, 41 Cal. 2d 180, 258 P. 2d 834." 
Key nun1ber: Trial 217, 232 (3). 
We think that because of the errors made in the 
instructions and because of the over emphasizing of the 
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instructions in Defendant's favor, that the Plaintiff was 
prejudiced and this Court should g:vant a new trial and 
the following authorities so hold. 
In the case of JENSEN vs. UTAH RY CO. 72 U. 
366, 270 P. 349. On page 355, the court says as follows: 
"and in such particular invokes the rule stated 
in Konold vs. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 U. 
379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St. Rep. 693, that the 
giving of inconsistent instructions is error and 
sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment, 
because, after verdict, it cannot be told which 
instruction was followed by the jury, or what 
influence the erroneous instruction had on their 
deliberations, and, as stated in Randall, Instruc-
tions to Juries, 537, that where instructions of 
the successful party state an erroneous rule, and 
those of the defeated party state the rule cor-
rectly, the only presumption permissible is that 
the jury disregard the true rule for the false; that 
an error of an instruction presenting a wrong 
theory of the case is not cured by other instruc-
tions announcing a right theory; and that, where 
instructions are in irreconcilable .conflict, or so 
conflicting as to confuse or mislead the jury, 
the rule requiring instructions to be, read together 
has no application." 
On page 357, the court says as follows: 
"The rule is well settled that instructing a 
jury as a mere abstract or general statement as 
to the law should be avoided, and that all instruc-
tions should be applicable to evidence on either 
one or the other of the respective theories of the 
parties." 
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And also on page 358 the court says as follows: 
"Thus the charge falls within the familiar 
rule that it is error to give instructions based on 
a state of facts which there is no evidence tending 
to prove, or which the undisputed evidence in 
the case shows did not exist, even though such 
instructions contain correct statements of law." 
In the case of SHIELDS vs. UTAH LIGHT & 
TRACTION CO. 99 U. 307, 105 P. (2d) 347, the court 
held it is prejudicial error to emphasize certain portions 
in favor of one party and the court says on page 349, 
second column: 
"Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the 
plaintiff by copying into her complaint certain 
sections of our statute (with the hope, no doubt, 
that the trial judge would include the same in 
the instructions relating to the pleadings) has 
been able to secure, in effect, an emphasis upon 
certain propositions of law as against others 
which are entitled to equal weight." 
In the case of DEv~NE vs. COOK, 3 U. (2d), 134, 
279 P. 1073, the headnote 5, states as follows: 
''In automobile accident case, instructions 
stating that contributory negligence which in any 
degree contributed to accident, or in any degree 
proxhnately contributed to accident to any extent, 
however slight, would be a defense was preju-
dicially erroneous, in vie": of other instructions 
concerning contributory negligence." 
And on pngP 1075, the eourt stated: 
"The instructions prejudicially accentuated 
the duty of the plaintiffs and 1ninimized the duty 
of the defendants." 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN ADMITTING CERTAIN 
TESTIMONIES. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN 
TESTIMONIES. 
These two points will be treated together. 
Plaintiff offered in evidence the hospital records 
and certain x-rays which the Court refused. Exhibit sheet 
(R. 62). These records were identified by Hortense Wood 
(R. 172, 173), the custodian of the records at the St. 
Mark's Hospital. Dr. Lamb testified from them. (R. 199, 
200, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208). They showed the condition 
of the Plaintiff and showed the basis of her treatment and 
would also come under the rule of law of records being 
made in the regular course of business and should have 
been admitted in evidence. 
The Court allowed the insurance adjuster, Lyle 
Bates, to mark on the photographs and to give his 
opinion about the blood spots, anti-freeze spot and skid 
marks which should not have been allowed. (R. 337, 339, 
350). 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that the Defendant was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law and the Court should have 
so instructed the jury, failing to do this the Court should 
have granted Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. 
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Bec.ause of the exception that the Court made to 
the rule that a person must drive within the distance 
in which he could see objects on the road. Because of 
the various erroneous instructions. Because of the 
Court's over emphasizing the duty of the Plaintiff and 
minimizing the duty of the Defendant. Because the 
Court over emphasized intoxication as to the Plaintiff 
and minimized it .as to the Defendant, prevented the 
Plaintiff from having a fair trial. For all or any one 
of these reasons, the case should be remanded to the 
District Court for a new trial. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment 
of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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